comparison, we can detect the evolving 'afterlives' of victims of the Japanese occupation, evident through the ever-changing symbolism attached to their remains in response to changing socio-political contexts. The cases examined amplify the processes involved in the manipulation of exhumed remains to serve the needs of the living, rather than reclaim the stories of the dead. Further, in serving the needs of the present, these cases illustrate that exhumations may inadvertently obfuscate the past rather than recover history.
Bukit Dunbar, Penang, 1946
Shortly after the reoccupation of Malaya in September 1945, the British military administration launched investigations to gather evidence to bring war crimes charges, not only against Japanese army personnel but also against civilian collaborators. These took the form of identity parades and public displays of photo line-ups of potential war criminals, the gathering of testimonies and affidavits from survivors and witnesses, as well as several exhumations at known killing sites. The authorities were compelled to proceed with the impending trials quickly, influenced in part by the need to assuage the vengeful mood pervasive among the Chinese community at that time, and in part by the need to address pressing issues, from food shortages and rehabilitation of essential industries to general reconstruction efforts. The sheer scale of the task was challenging amidst the confusion and chaos left by war; some Japanese army personnel had escaped or could not be located from nearby theatres of war, Indian National Army conscripts -who had been recruited by the Japanese ostensibly for an offensive against the British in India -had blended in with other civilian prisoners and PoWs, while potential witnesses or survivors were not always forthcoming. Against this backdrop, investigators appear to have relied heavily upon testimonies, more so than physical evidence, to secure convictions. For example, in a study of selected war crimes trial cases relating to Japanese atrocities in Malaya, it is evident that the opening of mass graves was conducted only sparingly.
14 For example, among the forty-seven cases examined by this researcher, only one trial introduced photographic evidence and supporting testimonies relating to an exhumation.
15
In this singular case, a mass grave at Bukit Dunbar on Thien Eok Estate near Gelugor town was excavated. The exhumation appears to have been conducted merely to provide supplementary evidence that multiple deaths had indeed taken place in Penang Gaol, and that bodies had been disposed of in mass graves on the site. The process was rudimentary; no medical officers or forensic scientists were involved. Further, testimony provided by Major Douglas Hayhurst, the second officer-in-charge of the No. 6 War Crimes Investigation Team, indicates that the exhumation was not exhaustive. For example, Major Hayhurst witnessed the opening of one mass grave measuring 50 feet in length and 3 feet wide. Though he estimated that its depth was probably 10 feet or more, the excavation work had stopped at 6 feet deep. When asked by the prosecuting officer how many remains were unearthed, he answered, 'I counted 232 skulls. ' When asked if there were other corpses in that mass grave, he answered, 'Yes, you could see them in layers. ' When asked if there was evidence of other graves, Major Hayhurst replied, 'there were three or more in the same area, though these were not disturbed' . There was no further investigation into the probable ethnicity, gender, and age of the victims or causes of death. It appears that the authorities merely assumed that since the majority of known victims were indeed Chinese, they were accountable only to the Chinese community. Local Chinese associations were consulted about the discovery, and upon their request, the remains were reinterred in situ. Arguably, such actions have compounded the myth of the 'Chinese as victim' to the exclusion of suffering experienced by all other ethnic groups. 16 And as the other graves were not opened, collectively how many were buried there was not determined. Instead, a host of local prison guards, undertakers, drivers, hospital staff, and other witnesses were crossexamined to establish that civilians had indeed been incarcerated, tortured, killed, or died while in custody and that they had been disposed of at Bukit Dunbar.
Why, then, was the mass grave at Bukit Dunbar excavated? In retrospect, it is clear that the exhumation was not so much concerned with the minutiae of the crimes committed, but in the site's value as both a visual and physical testament of Japanese atrocities. It is telling, for example, that during the trial, the presiding court official asked if photos of the exhumations had been released to the press. The response by the prosecuting officer is equally revealing: 'I believe one of the exhibits was released to the Chinese Press. ' Why was there concern in ensuring that images of the exhumation were made public? And why in particular were the Chinese media favoured? Perhaps the British were anxious to demonstrate to the Chinese community -the loudest segment of the local populace in demanding retribution -that the wheels of justice were indeed turning. 17 Or perhaps the British were intent on exposing the wanton 18 These were reinterred at Air Itam, beneath an obelisk commemorating 'Penang Overseas Chinese war victims, compatriots and transport workers' . 19 Omitted were details of how they had met their fate or the contexts in which they had lost their lives. Instead, the Luguo Bridge Incident of 1937 which had sparked the Second Sino-Japanese War was given prominence. Clearly, this was a memorial to commemorate tongbao -a Chinese term that can be read alternately as 'compatriot' or 'siblings from the same bloodline' . 20 In this final resting place, the remains were now transmuted into symbolic representations of the Chinese fallen, not in Penang or even Malaya alone, but martyrs in China's 'War of Resistance to Japan' . 21 However, it was only in 1951, in the midst of the Malayan Emergency, that this memorial was 'officially' unveiled to the larger public. The date chosen for the occasion was 11 November, to coincide with Remembrance Day, which marks the end of the First World War. Local Chinese community leaders re-dedicated the site as a Chinese anti-war memorial. Was this a deliberate attempt to 'neutralize' Chinese nationalism and to downplay historical links with the motherland, especially in light of the recent establishment of the communist People's Republic of China? Or perhaps it was to emphasize that the Chinese migrant community aspired towards being peaceful, law-abiding citizens of a future Malaya, quite separate from the wayward communist 'bandits' who were threatening peace in the territory. 22 In the decades following independence in 1957, and partially in response to the communist threat of the Malayan Emergency, large numbers of the Chinese migrant population were granted citizenship in an effort to domesticate them. Did the conversion of this minority group to Malayan citizens change how the Chinese viewed their war dead? In the next section, we examine an exhumation conducted in 1982 to explore this question.
Parit Tinggi, Negeri Sembilan, 1982
Xiao Wen Hu was seven years old in 1942 when Japanese soldiers arrived at Parit Tinggi village in Kuala Pilah district. The villagers were asked to assemble in a clearing, ostensibly to register for 'safe passes' . Unbeknown to the villagers, Captain Iwata Mitsugi had received orders from Seremban Headquarters to conduct a shukusei and that 'any Chinese found in [his] area were to be summarily executed' . 23 The assembled men, women and children were segregated into groups of about twenty, marched into the surrounding areas and killed. In total, 675 civilians lost their lives before the village was razed to the ground.
Xiao sustained five bayonet wounds but was among thirty survivors who lived to bear witness to this massacre. Like many other displaced persons, Xiao became a refugee; he eked out a living on the streets and was eventually sold into child labour before being adopted by an Indonesian Chinese family. When he reached adulthood, Xiao made his way back to Malaya. Each Qing Ming, the annual day for honouring ancestors, Xiao returned to the mass grave at Parit Tinggi, where he would make contact with other survivors and their relatives. With each passing year, the wish to honour the family he had lost grew in him. He vowed he would someday build a memorial so that the events of that tragic day would not be forgotten.
In 1981, Xiao's wish came true. The impetus to exhume and reinter the remains was prompted by the revelation that the mass grave was located on government land. It would only be a matter of time until this land would be redeveloped and the grave disturbed. Survivors and relatives, Xiao included, were concerned that they would no longer be able to visit and pay their respects on Qing Ming. With the support of local Chinese community associations, a committee was established in May to raise funds for exhumation works and to erect a memorial. Xiao led the committee as chairman.
The importance of being able to worship at the graves of ancestors at Qing Ming is rooted in tradition. According to Chinese beliefs, those who died 'bad' deaths, for example through suicide or murder, are destined to wander aimlessly as 'hungry ghosts' or 'beggar spirits' if they are forgotten by their descendants. 24 If unappeased, these spirits can wreak havoc upon the prospects of living relatives. To counter this, rituals have to be performed to ease their way in the underworld. In Malaysia, Buddhist rites, Taoist rituals, Confucian teachings, and local pagan customs have melded into a unique Chinese religion of sorts. 25 Despite this, the conduct of funeral and post-funeral rites continue to uphold many of the cultural traditions transmitted by the early generations of migrants.
The exhumation at Parit Tinggi in 1982 bore the hallmarks of a traditional Chinese funeral. A Buddhist priest offered prayers for the deceased before excavation works began. Again, as at Bukit Dunbar, no forensic scientist was involved. Hired labourers set to work with basic tools -cangkul (hoe) and baskets -while some volunteers sifted through the earth with their bare hands. There was no protocol involved in documenting the exhumation nor was there any attempt to reassemble the bones into complete skeletons. The remains gathered -tibia, femur, and rib bones in recycled cardboard boxes, skulls in gunny sacks and plastic pails -were relocated to a temporary tomb at the Kuala Pilah Chinese cemetery, even as construction works on a permanent memorial continued apace on the same site. The use of makeshift containers to hold the remains may seem haphazard, even callous and disrespectful. However, the handling of remains does not represent a significant aspect of the burial process. According to Chinese custom, in the absence of a body, what matters is that the spirit is saved from 'homelessness' through a proper burial and the allotment of a physical resting place. In this way, the deceased are restored to their 'proper position as ancestral ghost' . 26 In August 1984, the permanent memorial was unveiled. Survivors, relatives, the Chinese media, and representatives of various local Chinese organizations turned out en masse. Fruit, a roast pig, 'hell money' , incense, and other gift offerings were presented to ease the afterlives of the dead, while monks from a local Buddhist association chanted prayers. This was clearly a communal affair and in some respects, also a private one; for survivors like Xiao, they had fulfilled their filial obligation in ensuring their ancestors spirits would not be in limbo. The main inscription on the monolith, in Chinese characters, states that this is a memorial for Chinese tongbao. In a similar way to the remains reinterred at Air Itam, the loss of these lives was consecrated to the larger Chinese collective memory of sacrifice and martyrdom at the hands of the Japanese invaders. In contrast, a plaque in the Malay language states rather simply: 'To remember those lost in the events of Parit Tinggi, Kuala Pilah on 16th March 1942' . Above it, in Chinese, there is a similar though more explicit message: that those killed included Chinese men, women, the elderly, and children. A smaller plaque explains that the victims' remains were reinterred at this memorial so that members of the community can continue to pay their respect. In rescuing these remains from potential future desecration, communal sentiment has been strengthened through a narrative of common victimhood. By erecting a memorial, they have reinserted their collective memory into the historiography of the occupation. It is evident that by omitting any mention of the Second Sino-Japanese War on any of the inscriptions at this site, the survivors and descendants who participated in the exhumation and reinterment of the Parit Tinggi remains have asserted their personal and communal identification with their adopted land. The victims have been recast as part of a larger Malayan collective who were lost in one terrible chapter in the wider catalogue of Japanese aggression on Malayan soil. In the next section, we examine a more recent exhumation conducted in 2002. Given the passage of time, and with each successive generation, especially among those without firsthand experience of the war and who know no other home than Malaysia, what meaning or resonance can the war dead conjure for the settled Chinese minority?
Batu Caves, 2002
On 11 November 2002, Liew Yew Kiew, eighty-nine, formerly a villager of Sungai Tua, Batu Caves, led a contingent of Chinese press, Chinese association members, and Quek Jin Teck, secretary-general of the Malaysian Chinese Cultural Society, to a clearing amidst the thick undergrowth. They arrived bearing eighteen ceramic urns, adorned with lion heads. They were there to retrieve the remains of the '9-1 Martyrs' whose mass grave was threatened by state land redevelopment. Liew had witnessed the events of 1 September 1942, when a clandestine meeting of thirty Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) resistance members had been set upon by a Japanese army battalion. In the ensuing clash, many of the villagers were also massacred. Eighteen of the guerrillas were captured and beheaded; several of their heads were displayed afterwards at a roundabout in Ampang to serve as a public warning. 27 However, on that day in November, there was not a trace of human remains or material remnants to be found. In a symbolic gesture, handfuls of earth from the site were gathered instead into the urns. These were placed in hearses and ceremoniously driven to Nilai Memorial Park, a Chinese cemetery on the outskirts of the capital. At Nilai, the urns were buried in a ceremony attended by a gathering of about 100 Chinese community leaders and politicians. The reason for the relocation, Deputy Minister Tan Chai Ho explained, was 'to let the younger generation know that the 18 martyrs were heroes. Their sacrifices showed they were patriots who fought for the country. Such nationalistic attitude should be emulated. ' 28 To that end, a permanent memorial, it was envisaged, would also be erected on the site of the reinterred remains. A year later, in December 2003, the completed 9-1 Memorial was unveiled at an official ceremony attended by press, Chinese political and community leaders, as well as 100 visiting former MPAJA and Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) veterans from China. The message propagated was once again unabashedly political; this was an event to commemorate fallen heroes of the 'Resist Japan-Defend Malaya War of Resistance' . 29 The emphasis was clear: these were Malayan/Malaysian martyrs; their sacrifice was not limited to the Second Sino-Japanese War cause, but they had also acted out of patriotism for Malaya. There was no mention of the post-war communist insurrection, of forced deportations of communists by the British colonial administration to China, or of the connections between the MPAJA and the CPM leadership. Instead, what was clearly a Chinese communal affair was transmuted into a universal anti-war message, reminiscent of that propagated by Chinese leaders in 1951 in front of the Air Itam Memorial in Penang. 'We are a peace-loving nation' , Deputy Minister Datuk Donald Lim was quoted as saying, 'and the idea behind this memorial is more of an anti-war stance, which is fitting, considering that at this juncture there are wars going on around the world, like Afghanistan for instance. ' 30 In the mainstream press, the event was reported as a nostalgic reunion of former resistance fighters. In the alternative media, the opportunity was taken to remind the public that MPAJA fighters, who had sacrificed for the nation, had once been hunted as communist terrorists and bandits. Readers were also reminded that this same 'Chinese resistance was aided and supported by the British and the Allies'; further, that 'the resistance was actually quite multiethnic' . 31 The latter observation was a pointed reminder that not all wartime resistance fighters were communists or Chinese; there were Malay communists and resistance fighters as well.
Surprisingly, the reinterment and commemoration of the 9-1 Martyrs sparked little public debate. However, when it was revealed that an additional monument would be erected on the same site to remember 'Malayan heroes' of all ethnicities in the 'War of Resistance against Japanese Invasion' , there was public outcry. The Information Minister, Zainuddin Madin, of ethnic Malay origin, decried the plans as a 'monument for Communists' and called for its demolition. there is proof that a large number of them actually committed all kinds of atrocities against the people of this country under the communist banner?' 33 The leader of the opposition Democratic Action Party, Lim Kit Siang, released an open letter deriding Zainuddin's claims that all anti-Japanese fighters were communists and mocked the minister's earlier recorded statement that just because he was Information Minister, 'he knows history, he understands history, he is part of history and that he bears witness to history' . 34 Despite the controversy, the new monument was unveiled officially in September 2007. Beneath the obelisk, the message that this is 'a monument for Malayan heroes' is repeated in four languages -English, Malay, Tamil, and Chinese. As before, attendance at the commemoration ceremony comprised primarily Chinese community leaders, politicians, and MPAJA veterans. Curiously, Zhan Gujing, a political attaché of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Malaysia, led the commemoration proceedings. There was no coverage in the mainstream press and if there were any dissenting voices, they were silent.
Today, the two monuments still stand on opposing sides at the Anti-War Memorial site in Nilai Memorial Park. Despite exhortations by Chinese politicians that school trips should be organized so that the young can 'learn about the sacrifices made by those who fought for the country' , the site receives few public visitors. 35 It is not included on any tourist map and ambitious plans to build a museum on the grounds appear to have been abandoned. On a recent visit in 2012, this researcher noted that even though it was Qing Ming, and the cemetery was busy with visitors engaged in the annual ritual of remembering the dead, the memorial site was eerily desolate. Despite its professed raison d' être to honour martyrs of the Japanese occupation, the memorial appears to hold little resonance for the Malaysian public -Chinese or otherwise -at large. If the intention of the memorial was to be a political manoeuvre to insert Chinese collective war memory into the national historiography of the war, that attempt also appears to have failed.
Conclusion
Exhumations often resurrect ghosts from the pasts. As Verdery posits, the emotions, narratives, and commemorations they trigger often result in a reassessment of an uncomfortable past within society. 36 In Malaysia, however, exhumations -especially those conducted since independence -have not resulted in such opportunities. These exhumations have not promoted much empathy or sparked much interest among the general public, largely because the mass graves, the victims contained within, and the events that produced these mass corpses have been perceived (rather mistakenly) to have affected only the Chinese segment of the population. As such, the history of the Japanese occupation of Malaya, as it is propagated in contemporary Malaysia, remains partial and distorted. Thus, sensitive and thorny issues arising from the occupation remain unexplored and neglected -among them, questions of collaboration and complicity with the Japanese occupiers, and the deepening of inter-ethnic divisions between the Malay and Chinese communities in the aftermath of the occupation.
The conduct of exhumations and reinterment in more recent times demonstrates a desire on the part of the Chinese community to insert their collective communal war memory into the national historiography of the occupation. This is evident in the recasting of Chinese victims as Malayan martyrs and patriots; an overt attempt perhaps to minimize the community's migrant origins and to emphasize the community's participation in the liberation and decolonization of the nation. Rejection by the Malay political elite of these overtures indicates that national history and historiography remain in service to the national teleology of Malay supremacy. Under these circumstances, as Blackburn and Hack have observed, minority war histories are 'left to themselves, without the sponsorship of the state, to write their own histories, to nurture their own cultures, and to commemorate their own wartime past' . 
